The Plan
The origins of the raid are rather unusual. Various raids had been planned, but the Dieppe raid was brought into reality only by the desires of the new Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten. The actual raid was undertaken without the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and many elements in the planning suffered from the unofficial nature of the raid.The previous Chief of Combined Operations, Roger Keyes, who had commanded the famous raid on Zeebrugge in 1918, had been ordered to organise raids on occupied Europe. He was replaced by Mountbatten in 1941, through the direct intervention of Winston Churchill, and a number of raids took place - notably raids on Vaagso, Bruneval, and the larger attack on St Nazaire. Detractors of Mountbatten have contended that all the raids prior to Dieppe were originated under the leadership of Keyes.
The 1942 raid on Dieppe was initially planned for July and code-named Operation Rutter. The aim was relatively straight-forward: to seize and hold a major port for a short period, firstly to see if it was possible, also to gather intelligence from prisoners and captured materials and to examine the German responses. The nature of combined operations would also allow the Air Force to draw the Luftwaffe into a large, planned encounter and the use of Canadian troops would, it was hoped, satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. Churchill grew more supportive as the defeats in northern Africa incited a wave of press and parliamentary criticism.
Rutter was approved in May 1942. It consisted of a main attack onto Dieppe town beach, two flanking attacks, a thousand RAF sorties and a naval bombardment. The Canadian 2nd Division would lead the attack, elements advancing as far as Arques. The operation was scaled down, especially the RAF bombing support, but the troops boarded their ships on July 5. The weather became much worse while the ships were still in harbour and on July 7 the operation was cancelled.
Almost all concerned believed that a raid on Dieppe was now out of the question; Mountbatten did not. He began reorganising the aid from July 11 as Operation Jubilee. Despite not receiving Combined Chiefs of Staff authorisation, Mountbatten instructed his staff to proceed in late July. This lack of top-level go-ahead resulted in certain dislocations in the planning. For example, the failure to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Inter-Service Security Board meant that none of the intelligence agencies were involved, so no current information was added and, worse, details of the defunct Operation Rutter were leaked to the Germans through Double Cross agents.
Operation Jubilee still relied on the Canadian 2nd Division, they would attack Dieppe, Puys and Pourville while No. 4 Commando attacked Varengeville and No. 3 Commando attacked Berneval. Ground support was provided by thirty of the new Churchill tanks, delivered using the new LCTs (Landing Craft Tank).
Dieppe was weakly defended, in terms of the quality of the German soldiers. The 571st Regiment of the 302nd Infrantry Division was firmly category two and their commander, Conrad Haase, wisely kept them concentrated in the town with the heavier guns carefully concealed. Elements of the 571st defended the radar station near Pourville and the battery over the Scie at Varengeville. To the west the 570th Regiment manned a battery at Berneval.
The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England.
On the other side of the town at Pourville the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Cameron Highlander's made it ashore with few losses. The Saskatchewan advance on Dieppe was soon halted while the Camerons were halted just short of their objective. Both regiments suffered more as they withdrew; the bravery of the landing craft crew allowed 341 men to embark but increasing pressure meant that the rest were left to surrender. Another 141 had died.
The main attack was at three points: the tanks in the middle with the Essex Scots to the east and the Royal Hamiltons to the west. Attacking thirty minutes after the flanking assaults and onto a steep pebble beach all the groups were met with intense fire. The eastern assault was held at the beach. The western assault gained a hold in a shore-front casino but few soldiers made it across the road and they were soon held. The tanks arrived a little late to discover their landing point was difficult. Twenty-seven tanks were landed but only fifteen managed to climb the beach under unrelenting fire, those that reached the esplanade were completely stopped by anti-tank blocks and traps. Unable to leave the beach, the tanks provided fire support as they could and covered the retreat.
The debacle was compounded when, acting on fragmentary messages, the reserve were committed to the Dieppe beach at around 07.00. The 600 men of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal took fire all the way to the beach and on it. Only 125 made it back to England. The other part of the reserve, 40 Commando, was directed to the western edge of the town at 08.15. As the 200 man force approached and came under fire their commander, Joseph Phillips, refused to compound the losses and directed his force to withdraw - he was killed within moments of issuing the command to retreat.
At 10.50 a general order to retreat was issued. Casualty figures vary, but of the 6,090 men, according to one source, 1,027 were killed and 2,340 captured. Overhead the RAF and RCAF lost 119 aircraft while the Luftwaffe lost just 46. The German commanders were impressed by the bravery displayed but condemned the attack, it "mocked all rules of military strategy and logic."
There have been various attempts to re-evaluate the raid against larger objectives. Later analysts have assessed the raid as a gesture to the Soviets; a gesture to the Americans; a warning to the US about a premature invasion; or as a valuable intelligence gathering exercise for the later Operation Overlord.The Attack
Almost 240 ships left various ports on the night of August 18 and as they approached the French coast early on the 19th things began to go wrong. The Commando ships approaching to the east ran into a German coastal convoy; the German ships were quickly driven off with heavy losses, but coastal defences were alerted. Despite this the Commandos were successful in silencing the battery at Berneval and on the other flank 4 Commando destroyed the battery at Varengeville with great skill. The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly.
